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PANEL
The International Criminal Court: Contemporary
Perspectives and Prospects for Ratification
Professor Ruti Teitel
PROF. TEITEL:* Welcome to the International Criminal
Court panel. This promises to be a very exciting discussion. We are
very grateful to have the panelists who are participating here today.
They are all extraordinary experts in international criminal law; and
many of them actually played active roles in the drafting and
deliberations over the Statute for the International Court.1 I would
like to introduce our speakers. We have Major William Lietzau,
Deputy Legal Counsel, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Pentagon; Mr. Richard Dicker, Associate Counsel, Human
Rights Watch (HRW) and Director of HRW's Campaign for an
International Criminal Court; Dr. Roy Lee, former Director of the
Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, who
was the Secretary to the Rome Consulate for the United Nations;
Professor George Fletcher, Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence,
Columbia University School of Law and Professor Paul Dubinsky,
New York Law School. We will begin with Dr. Lee who will give an
overview of the proposal for the International Criminal Court, and
discuss the Court's current status.
Dr. Roy Lee
DR. LEE: Thank you, very much. It is very kind of you to
invite me to come to this gathering. Many thanks for organizing a
symposium on this very important subject. As indicated, I will give
. Ruti Teitel is the Stiefel Professor of Comparative Law at New York Law
School. She is also a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School, Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for
International Human Rights.
1 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doc. No. A/CONF. 183/9, 37 l.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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some general features of the International Criminal Court and identify
some of the important achievements at this United Nations
conference. I hope this will serve as a background for subsequent
discussions.
Last July, the United Nations succeeded in adopting an
international treaty for the establishment of the International Criminal
Court. This was, indeed, a very important achievement. For many, it
was considered as profound an achievement as the adoption of the
United Nations Charter itself; indeed, U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan himself heralded the agreement as a "giant step toward
universal human rights."
2
One might wonder why we need an international criminal
court. There are three good reasons for you to consider. First, in this
century we have witnessed the worst violence of mankind. In the past
50 years, more than 250 conflicts took place in which more than 86
million civilians - mostly women and children - died, and over 170
million people were stripped of their rights, their property and their
honor.3 What did we do for them? Most of these victims have simply
been forgotten. Only a few perpetrators have been brought to justice.
Second, we have numerous rules and laws defining and forbidding
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and conventions
and protocols banning everything from poison gas to chemical
weapons.4 But we do not have a system to enforce the law. For many
2 War Crime Court's Rules will Shield Dictators, says US, LONDON TIMES,
July 20, 1998 at 14 (quoting United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan).
3 See generally Jennifer L. Balint, An Empirical Study of Conflict, Conflict
Victimization and Legal Redress, in REINING IN IMPUNITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SIRACUSA CONFERENCE 17-21 SEPTEMBER 1998, at 101 (Nouvelles Etudes Penales No. 14,
Christopher C. Joyner, & M. Cherif Bassiouni, eds. 1998); see also Christopher C.
Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The Universal Declaration
and the Search for Accountability, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 591, 593 (1998);
M.Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for
Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 10 & n. 6 (1996).
4 See Principles of International Co-Operation in the Detection, Arrest,
Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30A, at 78,
U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) [hereinafter Principles of International Co-Operation]; see also
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951,
78 U.N.T.S. 277, 1951 A.T.S. 2 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; Convention on the
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people, law without enforcement is but empty words. The ICC will
give us a court to enforce the law. The third reason we need an
international criminal court is that under existing international law,
national courts should prosecute and punish international crimes
committed within their territories and by their nationals, 5 yet, this is
not happening. How many violations have been prosecuted by
national courts? In comparison to the record of violations,
prosecutions are relatively few.6  In recent conflicts, the national
courts concerned have been either unable or unwilling to prosecute the
perpetrators. For these reasons, the establishment of an international
criminal court is both needed and timely.
In the late 1940s, there were three big human rights projects
before the United Nations General Assembly. The first one was to
adopt a universal declaration to set out the fundamental human rights.
This was accomplished in 1948.8 The second project was to adopt a
legal instrument to prevent genocide. This was done a year later, in
1949.9 The third project was to create an International Criminal
Court. There, the adoption was postponed until, finally, in July 1998,
almost 50 years later, we concluded the Rome Statute establishing an
Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, G.A. Res. 48/65, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 68, U.N. Doe. A/48/49 (1993).
5 See, e.g., Lee A. Steven, Genocide and the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute:
Why the United States is in Breach of its International Obligations, 3 VA. J. INT. L. 425
(1999); see also Principles of International Co-Operation, 'supra note 4 (stating that
"[w]ar crimes and crimes against humanity, wherever they are committed, shall be subject
to investigation and the persons against whom there is evidence that they have committed
such crimes shall be subject to tracing, arrest, trial and if found guilty, punishment"); see
also Question of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed
Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2840 (XXVI), U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No.
29, at 444, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971) (stating that a "refusal by States to co-operate in the
arrest, extradition, trial and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes
against humanity is contrary to the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and to generally recognized norms of international law").
6 See Joyner, supra note 3, at 593.
7 See Douglas Cassel, Why We Need the International Criminal Court,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, May 12, 1999 at 532 (arguing that the International Criminal Court
"will hear cases of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity that national
governments are unable or unwilling to prosecute").
8 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III) (1948).
9 See Genocide Convention, supra note 4.
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international criminal court.'
°
You might wonder why it was so difficult to create an
international criminal court. You do not have to look very far for the
reasons. First, under existing criminal law systems, national courts
enjoy priority of jurisdiction over crimes committed within their
territories, by their nationals or against their nationals. 1 National
courts usually insist on applying their own laws, trying criminals
before their own courts and punishing criminals in their own jails.
Few states would volunteer to compromise their national criminal law.
As a result, there was really no room for an international criminal
court. We spent a long time looking for an angle that would allow a
place for an international criminal court without prejudice to national
jurisdiction. We did not succeed until last July. The second reason is
that crimes such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity are
highly political and involve sensitive issues. They are matters of great
concerns to the military, politicians and decision-makers. The level of
resistance is, therefore, very high.
Under the principle of "complimentarity," this International
Criminal Court will step in when national courts are unable or
unwilling to prosecute and punish such crimes.1 2 In other words, the
10 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 1, art. 1 (adopted July 17, 1998).
11 See id at preamble; see also Cassel, supra note 7.
12 See id. at Preamble, par. 10; id. at art. 1; id. at art. 17(1)(a),(b); & id. at art.
18. Article 1 of the Rome Statute clearly states that the ICC "shall be complementary
[sic] to national criminal jurisdictions." Id. at art. 1. "Complimentarity" is a "concept...
based on the view that the exercise of police power and penal law is a state prerogative
and that therefore national courts should have primacy over the ICC." Bartram S. Brown,
Primacy or Complimentarity" Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and
International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 424 (1998). However, this
"primacy" has certain limits as evidenced by the ways in which the Court may exercise
jurisdiction.
The Court may exercise jurisdiction in one of three ways: first, via a referral
by a State Party; second, via referral by the U.N. Security Council; and third, via an
investigation initiated by the Prosecutor. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 13.
Under the third method the Prosecutor for the ICC may of her own accord "initiate
investigations." See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 15(1). Before a case can be
initiated from a Prosecutor's article 15(1) investigation, the Prosecutor must receive
authorization from the Court's Pre-Trial Chamber; the Pre-Trial Chamber then determines
whether or not to send the issue on to the Court for a final determination "with regard to
the jurisdiction and admissibility of a case." See id. at art. 15(3), (4). When a case has
been referred to the Court for a determination on admissibility pursuant to article 15, the
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ICC will substitute, not supercede, national courts. This is important
because it will encourage national courts to exercise their jurisdiction
and to prosecute and punish criminals falling within their jurisdiction,
since if they do not, the International Court will step in and fill the
gap.
How strong is the support for the creation of an international
criminal court? Well, the statute was adopted by 160 states, 50 states
signed immediately and, today, we have close to 80 signatures. 3 We
need 60 states to ratify, in order to bring this instrument into force.
14
Regrettably, several states were unable to accept this Statute, among
them the United States, China and India.1
5
What are the crimes that will be covered by the Court? The
Court will cover the most serious crimes, namely, genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes16 The Court will also have
jurisdiction over crimes of aggression under the definition and
conditions to be agreed upon.'
7
You might wonder whether this Court would violate any
established international law principles since it will have jurisdiction
Court "shall" notify the States that "would normally exercise jurisdiction over the
crimes;" the State in question can then choose to exercise its jurisdiction over the matter.
See id. at art. 18(1), (2). Should the Prosecutor defer to a State, the investigation of the
matter by the State remains opens for review in the event of the State's "unwillingness or
inability genuinely to carry out the investigation." See id. at art. 18(3).
13 But see Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 22 (1999) (noting that at the conclusion of the United
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the ICC, the
Rome Statute had been adopted by a nonrecord vote of 120 in favor, 7 against, and 21
abstentions).
14 See id. at 42.
15 See Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International Criminal Law?, 93 Am.
J. INT'L L. 452, 454 (1999) (observing that the United States voted against ratification and
that the "identities of the other opposing states are not certain. There is little doubt,
however, that they included China, Israel, Libya and Iraq.").
16 See id. (stating that "the illegality under international law of the gravest
human rights violations of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime
of aggression ... will be reinforced as a result of the adoption and entry into force of [the
Rome Statute]").
17 See Arsanjani, supra note 13, at 30 (indicating that Article 5(2) of the
Rome Statute "incorporates the crime of aggression, but the court may exercise
jurisdiction in that regard only after the crime has been defined and the conditions for
such exercise have been agreed upon.").
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over national forces of non-party States. My own answer to that
question is, no. Under existing international law, the state in whose
territory genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity have been
committed or whose nationals are victims of such crimes, is legally
competent and obligated to investigate and prosecute persons accused
of such crimes. 18 Since a state already has a legal obligation to do so
individually, states are not prevented from creating an international
criminal court jointly for purposes of implementing this obligation.
The Court's jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states does not
therefore violate any principle of treaty law, and the Rome Statute has
not created any entitlements or legal obligations that do not already
exist under international law. Besides, the Rome Statute has not
created any treaty obligations for non-party states. The cooperation of
non-party states is purely voluntary.
I now wish to turn to the most important achievements of the
Rome Statute. First, it has managed to maintain a very delicate
balance between justice and peace. Under this principle, the Security
Council will be able to refer situations to the International Criminal
Court for it to investigate and prosecute.1 9 The Security Council will
also be able to request the Court to withhold its proceedings in cases
where the Security Council considers that it is necessary to pursue a
certain peace arrangement. 20 A delicate balance is thus maintained, in
my view, between the responsibilities of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security on the one hand, and
the objective of international justice pursued by the Court, on the
other.
Secondly, the Rome Statute creates a true international,
independent criminal prosecution system. Under this system, the
prosecutor will be able to initiate investigations and prosecutions.21
However, at the same time, there exists in the Statute a series of
checks and balances designed to make sure that the prosecutor will
not abuse the rights entrusted to him or her, and to ensure that he or
18 See id. at 25 (explaining that "[t]he understanding of the majority of
participating states was that states had a vital interest in remaining responsible and
accountable for prosecuting violations of their laws").
19 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 13.
20 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 16.
21 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 15.
510 [Vol. XVI
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she will be able to take the necessary action when there is sufficient
evidence pointing in that direction. 22  Adequate provisions and
procedures are also embodied in the Statute to allow the accused
individuals and the states concerned, whether or not they are parties to
the Statute, to challenge and to intervene at all stages of the
proceedings before the Court that may affect their interests. 23
The third important achievement is the creation of a truly
international criminal law system. The system is based on criminal
law principles extracted from national laws, and is further supported
by more than seventy articles focusing on the procedural aspects of
the system.24 It is perhaps the best and most comprehensive one we
have designed so far at the international level. This international
criminal law system was the result of hard work contributed by
hundreds of expert representatives over a period of several years. It
therefore represents a successful harmonization of objectives and
values long recognized under divergent national criminal law systems.
The accused will therefore be entitled to have the best guarantees to
justice and a fair trial known under existing international law.
This Statute is, of course, not perfect. We only had five weeks
to wrap up a Statute containing 120 articles. You can imagine what
that means. It was a daunting task. Imperfections are therefore
unavoidable. A correction procedure is taking place to rectify certain
typographical and stylistic errors. The Preparatory Commission has
also begun its work and is progressing well. It is expected that the
elements of crimes and the rules of procedure and evidence will be
complete by next June. Efforts are also being made to address issues
that were left open in the Rome Statute.
The important message I would like to leave with you is the
following: it took us 50 years to create this International Criminal
22 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 3, arts. 42 - 54.
23 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 19.
24 See 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 8-9 (2d ed.
1999) "International criminal law is a relatively new discipline that consists of the penal
and procedural aspects of international law and the international procedural aspects of
national criminal law. The penal aspects of international law establish, through
conventions, custom and general principles, international crimes, and identify elements of
criminal responsibility and enforcement modalities. The penal aspects of international
law have also increasingly dealt with procedural and enforcement modalities, which had
traditionally fallen within the province of national criminal law." Id.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
Court. Imperfect as it is, the important thing is that we have done it. I
think that it is timely and well justified to have such a criminal court.
It will give us an enforcement system, which we needed and did not
have. It will help us to enforce the law. We must continue our efforts
and make sure that it will work and will be effective. This Court is, in
my view, one of the most important achievements of this century. I
hope you will follow the development in the Preparatory
Commissions, which will lead us to the implementation of the Rome
Statute. Thank you.
PROF. TEITEL: Thank you very much, Dr. Lee. It is a real
pleasure to hear from the Secretary to the Rome Conference. Now,
we will hear from Major Lietzau, who is Counsel to the Office of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was part of the U.S.
delegation at the Rome Conference.
Major William K. Lietzau, U.S.MC.
MAJOR LIETZAU: First, I would like to thank you for
inviting me here. It is always nice to get out of the Pentagon. I would
like to note that I am one of the only U.S. officials that negotiated
both the Ottawa Convention to ban landmines and the Rome Treaty to
establish an International Criminal Court - two treaties that were
widely and rapidly supported, but did not include the United States on
the list of proponents. I mention this to encourage questions and
discussion regarding the larger foreign policy concerns raised by this
nascent pattern.
Recognizing the time constraints, there is really no way to
grapple with all of the issues involved in such an important
undertaking as the International Criminal Court. Therefore, what I
intend to do is to proffer some ideas for an academic discussion - the
kinds of things, I think, that need to be contemplated in determining
what the U.S. posture toward this Court should be.
The United States' position is best summarized by the fact
that, as Dr. Lee noted, we were one of seven states that voted against
the treaty on the last day of the diplomatic conference. The United
States called for the vote, which favored the treaty text by 120 to 7;
512 [Vol. XVI
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and I believe there were 21 abstentions. 25 The United States' position
rightnow, for those not familiar with it, is that we will not sign the
current treaty text in its present form, and there is no prospect we will
sign this treaty in its present form in the future.26 We have considered
the posture of "benign neglect" of the possibly forthcoming
International Criminal Court, and we have rejected that policy option.
Well, where does this leave us? As Ambassador Scheffer - U.S.
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, has stated several times
(and as has been reflected by Secretary Madeline Albright) - we are
optimistic that we will have the opportunity to work toward
appropriate modifications or accommodations that we think could
bring this treaty better in line with international law and a more
appropriate role in international society.27 Directly opposing the
treaty is not anyone's ideal solution, since the U.S. has supported this
undertaking in concept for years.
As I just mentioned, the United States has, in fact, consistently
supported the concept of an International Criminal Court. For reasons
given by Dr. Lee, anyone who surveys the last decade, sees a world
situation where entire populations are sometimes terrorized and
slaughtered by wayward military forces and, most frequently, by their
own governments. The manifest nature of this fact is clear to anyone
who has looked into R. J. Rummel's work or that of John Norton
Moore or others who have identified how frequently people die by the
hand of their own governments. 28 The United States has been at the
forefront of efforts to establish the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
and the Tribunal handling the crimes that took place in Rwanda, with
the goal of bringing to justice those who have been involved in the
25 See Arsanjani, supra note 13.
26 See UN: US Appeals in Committee for Support of Other Nations to Resolve
Problems of Criminal Court Statute, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 22, 1999, available in 1999 WL
24364055.
27 See UN: Preparatory Commission for International Criminal Court begins
First Session, M2 PRESSWIRE, Feb. 17, 1999, available in 1999 WL 12605515.
28 See, e.g., RUDOLPH J. RUMMEL, CHINA'S BLOODY CENTURY: GENOCIDE
AND MASS MURDER SINCE 1900 (1991); RUDOLPH J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT
(1994); RUDOLPH J. RUMMEL, POWER KILLS: DEMOCRACY AS A METHOD OF NONVIOLENCE
(1997); JOHN NORTON MOORE, LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD (1974);
JOHN NORTON MOORE, STRUGGLE FOR PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA: AND THE
DETERIORATION OF THE GLOBAL DETERRENT SYSTEM (1987).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
most heinous violations of international law.29 That humanitarian
posture alone does not, however, lead to the conclusion that we should
similarly join the International Criminal Court, as admirable as the
motives behind it may be. Similarly, the United States is at the
forefront in de-mining around the world - getting rid of the land
mines that are in the ground.30 But that fact does not militate in favor
of signing the Ottawa Convention.
3 1
So why is the United States not joining so many nations who
have expressed their approval of the International Criminal Court
Statute? The answer, I believe, is found in two types of concerns.
One is a process-based concern and another is a concern with respect
to the substance of the treaty itself. With respect to process, you just
heard Dr. Lee describe the situation in which he spent five weeks in
Rome with the goal of accomplishing as much as could be
accomplished in those five weeks. I think, in fact, it is an incredible
testament to many like Dr. Lee that a statute has resulted from such a
short negotiation. I remember, anecdotally, one delegate departing
Rome early - his particular issue having been addressed. As he left,
he opined that there would not be a treaty resulting from the
negotiation, and that he would therefore be seeing us in Rome the
following summer. Of course, he was wrong, and I will always regret
not having taken him up on the wager he had offered.
One negative consequence of the rapid success in negotiation
was the mechanism used for drafting. It was a very short time to
accomplish a lot, and the negotiation resulted in what was literally, a
middle-of-the-night, take-it-or-leave-it package, put together by the
chairman of the committee of the whole and particular members of his
bureau. The text included significant provisions that had not been
seen before as drafted, and countries had less than twenty-four hours
to decide whether they would accept the package or not. Some
articles in that take-it-or-leave-it package had never been negotiated
on the open floor at all. And obviously, last-minute deals are a
29 See The Long Arm ofInternational Law, CHI. TRIB., July 11, 1999, at 16.
30 See Barbara Amiel, Lloyd Axworthy: A Profile in Stubbornness,
MACLEAN'S, Jan. 18, 1999, at 11.
31 Ottawa Process: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Jan. 1998, 36
I.L.M. 1507.
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necessary part of treaty negotiations, but should they occur to such an
extent and with regard to such fundamental, substantive portions of a
treaty as in this case? Is such a drafting mechanism appropriate in a
treaty creating as important an institution and one with such extensive
coercive authority as this one?
This leads us to another kind of process-based concern; that is
the departure from consensus-based treaty making. If we look at the
major treaties in the international humanitarian law arena, we find that
they are adopted, for the most part, with a consensus-based
negotiating dynamic. Moreover, the UN General Assembly, which
sponsored this treaty, has long been biased in favor of consensus
resolutions. Though some treaties are not consensus-based in their
negotiation, they are not usually treaties as significant as the one we
see here. This is a trend that should cause concern. One may find
indicators of this emerging pattern in the "fast-track" process of the
Ottawa Convention negotiations. Ottawa represents the fastest entry
into force of any major treaty, and it is being touted as such - a big
success. 32 Indeed, there is that positive aspect to Ottawa, it came into
being very quickly; but at what cost? That text was finalized only
after the U.S. pulled out of negotiations when it became clear there
was no prospect for consensus agreement and the text would be voted
through. Is that the right mechanism to use? How does the voting
model of treaty-making impact the stature of a superpower like the
U.S.? I merely offer this as a question right now, but it involves
ramifications that need to be considered as we find our place in the
emerging world order.
We should carefully consider whether a delay is so offensive
that we want to push something through without consensus - a
consensus that captures the fundamental tenets of reciprocity and
consent that have so long served as a foundation for international law.
I believe we need to think very carefully before we move into a
process where a majority of countries can vote something through and
make it international law, especially, in this case where it claims
authority over nonparty nationals. As a member of the Indian
Parliament said at the beginning of this General Assembly session in
32 UN. Negotiations on Convention to Prohibit Use of Nuclear Weapons
Called for in Disarmament Committee Text, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 26, 1999.
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response to a characterization of the International Criminal Court
Statute as "an expression of global people power," "[i]n countries
which contain two-thirds of the world's population, the negotiations
on the International Criminal Court did not raise a ripple; world public
opinion was not engaged. 33  The fact that such significant states
failed to vote in favor of this treaty should give us pause to question
whether major international law principles should be developed using
a "fast-track" approach.34
Though there are other areas of concern in this regard, due to
time constraints, I will move quickly to substance. The biggest
concern for the United States and others is that this treaty is too easily
used as a tool for political manipulation and potential abuse - with
politically-motivated charges that can be oriented toward a particular
foreign policy. The Statute provides a diminished role for the
Security Council compared to that found in current international
structures. The Court stands on its own authority, essentially outside
of the purview of the Security Council, and it creates a jurisdictional
regime that claims authority over nonparty nationals. This
jurisdictional regime, detailed in Article 12, causes the greatest
concern for the United States. 35 We cannot get into a debate right
now about the legal rubric that presumably predicates this regime, but
at the very least, its pedigree is questionable. More importantly, one
must question whether, as a policy matter, it is a good idea. Taking it
to its logical extreme, we should be concerned by the notion that a
majority of states can simply establish international law by majority
vote and then create a jurisdictional regime that can enforce that law,
all without consent of other states.
The results of failing to adequately address these concerns,
both substantive and procedural, can be seen in a number of ironies, or
perhaps "perversities," incorporated into the Statute. For example, the
jurisdictional regime would allow the Court to have jurisdiction over a
33 U.N General Assembly 53d Sess., U.N Doc. A/53/PV.13, Sept. 24, 1998
[General Debate] (statement ofAtal Behari).
34 As of March 2000, India had yet to become a signatory to the Rome
Statute. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Ratification Status
(visited March 25, 2000) < http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/ status.htm>.
35 See Arsanjani, supra note 13, at 26 (discussing Article 12, which deals with
the jurisdiction of the court, and the United States' opposition to it).
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state that was not party to the Convention, so long as the territory
where the alleged offense took place, consented or was itself party to
the Convention. 36 Yet, Article 11 of the Treaty describes a temporal
jurisdictional provision that arguably shields a state party's nationals
from the Court's jurisdiction in ways not available to nonparty
nationals. 37 Article 11 limits the Court's exercise of jurisdiction for
states that join after entry-into-force to only those crimes committed
after entry-into-force for that state. Obviously, no such limitation can
exist for nonparty nationals. Imprecisely worded, one might question
whether a state's individual nationals are exempted prior to entry-into-
force, but shielding individuals was clearly the intent of the drafters.
Likewise, because of the extraordinary way deals were cut in
the last hours of the negotiation, Article 124 creates a seven-year war
crimes opt-out for states parties. 38 This was given to the French to
coax them away from other permanent members of the UN Security
Council. Again, imprecisely worded, one could question whether the
provision really shields individuals, but I can assure you that such was
the intent of those who negotiated this provision. Again, no such
jurisdictional limitation is available to non-party nationals. Therefore,
a state that becomes party to the treaty can opt out of war crimes and
actually limit the court's jurisdiction over its own citizens while
nationals of non-party states are subject to the entirety of the court's
subject matter jurisdiction. Some have described this as an
inducement to join the treaty. At best it is a thoughtless error; at worst
it is an unabashed attempt to further isolate the United States in the
final hours of the negotiation by drawing away one or more
permanent members of the Security Council. Regardless of the
motivation, it illustrates an unprincipled characteristic of the
jurisdictional regime.
Article 121, the amendment provision, presents the clearest
example of a jurisdictional anomaly, since its language is
unambiguously oriented toward individuals as opposed to states.
39
Under paragraph five of that article, amendments to the list of crimes
36 See id.
37 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 11.
38 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 13, art. 124.
39 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 13, art. 121.
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within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court are not applicable
against nationals of states parties that fail to ratify the amendment.4 °
Therefore, states that join the treaty have the ability to shield their
citizens from jurisdiction over all crimes not currently in the Statute.
There is no similar limitation, however, to the list of crimes that is
potentially available for application against non-party nationals.
Therefore, in theory, United States citizens could be made subject to
the jurisdiction of the Court for any number of currently unknown
future offenses, even if the U.S. were not party to the treaty, whereas
states parties could effectively shield their nationals.
Beside highlighting the unprincipled nature of the
jurisdictional regime, this last example provides a good illustration of
the unfortunate technical consequences of this last-minute package
approach to treaty making. With substantial portions of the treaty still
unwritten on the last night of the five-week conference, the drafting
committee was obviously unable to complete its work of rationalizing
various constituent texts. Dozens of technical/administrative errors
were discovered and corrected after the vote on the Statute's text and
after many had already signed the treaty. These corrections had (or
have) varying degrees of substantive effect. In the case of Article
121, paragraph 5, the version initially distributed describes the
amendment procedure for substantive offenses as applying to "Article
5" amendments. At the time the deal was cut on this provision, the
working drafts of the pertinent portions of the Statute listed all crimes
in Article 5. That article was subsequently parsed into Articles 5, 6, 7,
and 8, with Article 5 only referring to the broad categories of crimes,
but Article 121 was never concomitantly adjusted.4' The drafters of
Article 121 clearly did not intend for it to only preclude jurisdiction
over a new category of crimes, and a change will likely appear in the
next version of the treaty.42
40 See id. "In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment,
the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment
when committed by that State Party's nationals or on its territory." Id.
41 See, e.g., David J. Scheffer, Developments in International Criminal Law:
The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12, 20-21
(1999) (discussing Article 12 I's shared jurisdiction with Article 12, claiming it is due to a
lack of adjustment to Article 121).
42 This prediction was in fact accurate, as evidenced in current versions of the
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In an attempt to achieve some form of balance, drafters of the
International Criminal Court's jurisdictional regime combined
features that, at one extreme, would create an inherently strong,
uninhibited court capable of trying all crimes without regard to any
opt-outs or other exceptions, and, at the other extreme, would
completely satisfy the sovereignty concerns of all states. The mix that
came out of Rome, however, viewed from the most critical or
negative perspective, is arguably the worst of both worlds. Consider,
for instance, the hypothetical of peacekeepers becoming involved in
an internal armed conflict. The peacekeepers would be vulnerable to
prosecution by the ICC if the state or territory where the alleged
offense took place consented.43 Yet, the perpetrator of the most
heinous internal humanitarian tragedies within that country would not
be subject to ICC jurisdiction without Security Council referral.44
Here, we have a Court that potentially threatens peacekeepers and the
foreign policy of the states that provide them, yet it does not have
jurisdiction over the crimes that we agree have wrought the most
tragic humanitarian disasters in the last several decades.
Allow me to only briefly mention some other problems with
the treaty. There is a no-reservations clause - something the U.S.
Senate has consistently opposed; the crime of transferring citizens into
treaty. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Adopted at Rome on
17 July 1998 -Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc No. PCNICC/1999/INF/3 (1999) (Third
Session of the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court).
43 Interestingly, this hypothetical has in some respects, come true. See Steven
Lee Myers, Kosovo Inquiry Confirms U.S. Fears of War Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
3, 2000, at A6. "Officials of the [International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia] ... completed an internal report in late December that was a legal analysis of
the possibility that the NATO allies had committed war crimes during their 78-day
campaign against Yugoslavia." Id. Quoting Diane F. Orentlicher from American
University, the Times reported that, "The United States has been ... afraid of how an
international criminal court will act with regard to American soldiers.., and now it turns
out... that the international tribunal for Yugoslavia has that jurisdiction." Id. Although
Carla Del Ponte, the chief prosecutor for the ICTY, stated that there was very little
possibility that either America or NATO would be charged with any war crimes, neither
the Pentagon nor the White House seem to dispute the tribunal's jurisdiction over the
matter. Id.
44 See Jelena Pejic, The Tribunal and the ICC: Do Precedents Matter?, 60
ALB. L. REv. 841, 858-59 (1997) (articulating the fear that "this mechanism" subjects the
ICC to the "political considerations of the Security Council, thereby undermining its
independence, effectiveness and credibility").
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occupied territories provides fertile ground for political manipulation;
and the Statute paves the way for the potential crime of aggression -
a state offense that, again, can be easily abused for political
purposes.45 As I am almost out of time, I will leave discussion of
these issues for questions.
I would, however, like to give you a thumbnail's sketch of the
way ahead for the immediate future. The U.S. is preparing to engage
other delegations at the first preparatory commission meetings next
week. The primary purpose of those meetings will be negotiating the
elements of crimes and the rules of evidence and procedure - the
nuts and bolts of criminal law under this Statute. In these matters, we
are not simply considering the rights of states vis-A-vis other states,
but the balance between individual rights and the interests of justice.
In this regard, the United States is going the extra mile to stay
engaged in this process. This is done with the hope that before this
Treaty comes into force, we can secure some modifications or
accommodations that will allow us to join the Court and participate in
seeing it fulfill the most noble purposes for which it was conceived.
Thank you.
PROF. TEITEL: Thank you very much Major Lietzau. I am
sure that there will be time in the Q & A to address some of the
interesting points of controversy here. Let me turn now to Professor
George Fletcher, Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence at Columbia
University School of Law. He has written on topics such as criminal
law, legal philosophy, torts and, most recently, With Justice for Some;
Victims' Rights in Criminal Trials as well as Basic Concepts of
Criminal Law.46 I welcome my friend and colleague, George Fletcher
to address some of the points raised by the International Criminal
Court.
45 But see Philippe J. Sands, The Future of International Adjudication, 14
CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1999) (arguing that the United States' fear of aggression is
misplaced because "it is clear from the Statute that the definition of aggression has not
been settled and jurisdiction on this head will not apply until there is a definition of
aggression established by amendment of the Statute").
46 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW
(1998).
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Professor George Fletcher
PROF. FLETCHER: Thank you. It is a pleasure for me to be
here this afternoon to address some of the difficult questions raised by
the Rome Statute. I want to begin by saying that, I think, that the
basic idea of the International Criminal Court is very sound. It is one
that I strongly support. I imagine that everyone here on the Panel
supports the idea. I dissent, as well from the official United States'
policy which seems to be preoccupied with the jurisdictional question,
that is, with American military forces being charged with war crimes
or crimes against humanity when they are engaged in the missions on
the territory of member states. It strikes me as unfortunate that the
United States has directed its critical focus to that question, which
reveals a fundamental distrust of the political reliability of the other
countries who will participate in creating this Court and of the judges
who will be serving on the Court.
1 have other concerns that I want to stress and I wanted to
voice these concerns in the hope of contributing to a process that will
lead to improvements in the Statute. These are improvements that
deeply concern me, not as an international lawyer, but as a criminal
lawyer. If you read the Statute carefully, from the point of view of a
criminal lawyer, you cannot but be very seriously disappointed by the
sloppiness of the drafting, by the conceptual confusion, and by the
inability to think through basic questions. I am going to be precise,
and hope that you will bear with me as I talk about the specific
provisions in the Statute.
First, one of the most fundamental problems that is going to
arise in the administration of the Statute will be the very simple fact
that the Statute is written in six official languages.47 Lecturing on the
Rome Statute recently in Spain, I based my analysis on the Spanish
version of the Statute and I quickly discovered that there were
fundamental differences between the Spanish version and the English
version, and we are talking about two languages that are close
neighbors. I expect that there will be substantial disparities with the
French version and Russian versions as well. And I am willing to bet
47 See Rome Statute, supra note I. Besides English, the Statute is printed in
Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish.
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that working through the official Arabic and the Chinese translations
of the Statute, we would find substantial conceptual variances. It is
very difficult to find conceptual common ground among legal systems
that are as diverse as these six are. Even as between the Spanish and
the English versions, I had the feeling that there was little attention
paid to the problem of one-to-one mapping between one set of
provisions and the other set of provisions. In certain areas, the
Spanish and English texts are totally different. We have to keep in
mind there will be 18 judges on the Court and these 18 judges will
represent diverse countries, diverse legal systems, and presumably use
different official versions of the Statute.48  The risks of
misunderstanding are overwhelming.
There is a basic conceptual problem in the structure of the
Statute that, I think, accounts for many difficulties that I am going to
talk about today. This Court differs fundamentally from other courts
that have a distinctive relationship to a legislative body. Typically, a
legislative body defines the offenses and then a court applies and
enforces the defined offenses. This Statute is different in the sense
that the Statute also defines the offenses that the Court has a capacity
to enforce so that Article 5 of the Statute tells us that the jurisdiction
of the Court shall be limited to very specific crimes. 49 We have heard
those mentioned already - crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and, possibly, crimes of aggression, which have
not yet been defined. The "jurisdiction" is also used in other senses in
the statute, but I just want to highlight the fact that, according to
Article 5, the "jurisdiction" of the Court is limited to the most serious
48 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 36.
49 Id. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 5. The statute delineates the
jurisdiction of the Court as follows:
The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as
a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this
Statute with respect to the following crimes:
a) The crime of genocide;
b) Crimes against humanity;
c) War crimes;
d) The crime of aggression."
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crimes of concern to the international community and it has
jurisdiction, in accordance with this Statute, only with respect to the
three crimes mentioned. 50 The usage of the term "jurisdiction" in
Article 5 will, as we shall see, raise some serious problems.
Before turning to these complexities of "jurisdiction," I wish
to address a fundamental problem, that is whether the purpose of the
International Criminal Court is to prevent the causation of harm or
whether it is designed to punish bad acts in and of themselves. That is
a fundamental question in the theory of criminal law. The preliminary
question in all systems of criminal law is whether the focus of the
jurisdictional and prosecutorial powers should be preventing harm or
punishing evil as an end in itself. The difference between these two
purposes can be captured in the words: prospective and retrospective.
Is the purpose of the Court to look backward to the commission of the
crime and to apply sanctions in order to do justice or should the Court
use its power, prospectively, to deter the occurrence of crimes within
its jurisdiction? Most advocates of the ICC argue in the language not
of retributive punishment but of prevention and deterrence. Yet the
Preamble to the Statute clearly favors the imposition of punishment as
an imperative of justice. Note the following language from the
Preamble:
Mindful that during this century millions of children,
women and men have been victims of unimaginable
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity,
Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace,
security and well-being of the world,
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must
be ensured by taking measures at the national level
50 Id.; see also Rome Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 6 - 8 (defining crimes
enumerated in Article 5).
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and by enhancing international cooperation, .. 51
This language suggests that the purpose of the ICC is almost
exclusively to punish offenders justly in order to avoid the impunity
of offenders and to vindicate the status of the victims. There is no
reference or no suggestion that the purpose of the Court is preventive
or that the purpose of the Court is to intervene early in the genesis of
potential war crimes in order to prevent their commission in the
future. Of course, domestic criminal jurisdiction does that. We have
inchoate crimes like incitement, possession offenses, attempts,
conspiracy and all of these are designed to permit the Court to
intervene and then restrain the individual before harm occurs.
52
This conclusion provides an important perspective on
interpreting the specific crimes within the "jurisdiction" of the court.
Let us look first at the provision on Genocide. Article 6 contains a
portion of the original genocide convention, but only a portion of it.
53
This is the way it reads in English (one of the six official languages of
the Treaty):
For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any
of the following acts committed with intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group;
51 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Preamble.
52 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01 - 5.07 (Official Draft & Revised
Comment, Amer. Law Inst. 1985). In the introduction to Article 5, the drafters of the
Model Penal Code set out the purposes of inchoate crimes: (1) to have legal basis to
intervene in a commission of a crime; (2) to have safeguards to deal with actors who are
disposed of committing a crime; and (3) to not exculpate an actor who fails to reach his or
her desired result. Article 5 covers Criminal Attempt, § 5.01; Criminal Solicitation, §
5.02; Criminal Conspiracy, § 5.03; Incapacity, Irresponsibility or Imunity of Party to
Solicitation or Conspiracy, § 5.04; Grading of Criminal Attempt, Solicitation and
Conspiracy, § 5.05; and Possessing Instruments of Crime, § 5.06.
13 Compare Genocide Convention, supra note 4, at art. 2 with Rome Statute,
supra note 1, Part 2, art. 6.
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(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.
54
Now what do these provisions mean? We can understand the
reference to "killing." That is the prototypical way of committing
genocide. But what is "causing serious mental or bodily harm?" I
suppose that could qualify in the popular understanding of genocide,
provided that mental or bodily harm were likely to lead to the
extinction of the particular group. But the criteria are already
beginning to get disturbingly vague because all that is required under
Article 6 is an intention to bring about the destruction of the group "in
whole or in part." 55 Would it be enough to subject one person to
''serious mental or physical harm" with a view toward causing the
death of that person? One would not think so, but the language of the
statute seems at least to imply that aggression against two people
constitutes inflicting harm on the "members of the group."
Part (c) enters into even vaguer territory by suggesting that
infliction of harsh conditions of life is enough to constitute genocide.
But let us pass on to parts (d) and (e), which reveal the enormous
sweep of the crime of genocide. Part (d) tells us that genocide is
committed when there is any campaign to reduce the rate of
pregnancy in order to curtail population growth. Somehow, one feels
that the drafters cannot be serious about this. They have some
paradigm of evil in mind, but they are not telling us precisely what it
is. Part (e) is more disturbing, for this section does not require even
physical or mental harm or a reduction in population. The evil
addressed by banning the forcible transfer of children from one group
to another is cultural and not genocidal. I think that what the drafters
have in mind is something like the taking of Aborigine children in
54 Rome Statute, supra note 1, Part 2, art. 6.
55 ,
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Australia and forcing them to grow up in White homes so that they
assimilate into a different culture. Significantly, the crime is
committed by the very act of transferring the children to the homes
where they are supposed to grow up. In other words, the crime is
committed at the early stage of preparation - prior to the cultural
assimilation or the infliction of any other harm.
The very nature of genocide as a crime is that it is inchoate.
All five of these provisions represent early stages in a course of action
that could lead to the extinction of the "group" in the long run.
According to the statute, then, the Nazis committed genocide the first
time they approached a Jew with the "final solution" in mind.56 The
first time the Israeli government took Sephardi children and placed
them in Ashkenasi homes for the purpose of assimilation, the
government committed genocide. 57 This reading of the statute, which
is indeed faithful to the words on the page, verges on the absurd. This
is not what ordinary people mean when they talk about genocide, and
it is hard to believe that the drafters would have deviated so far from
the ordinary, lay understanding of the crime. Furthermore, the way
the provision on genocide is drafted, the focus of the crime is placed
on the earliest possible stages of commission, thus violating our
interpretive premise that the purpose of sanctions under the ICC treaty
is not to anticipate and prevent harm but to punish harm that has
already occurred.
Genocide, as we will recall, is one of four crimes now
recognized under Article 5 as constituting the "jurisdiction" of the
ICC.5 8 Let us explore some of the problems raised by this conception
of jurisdiction. Article 25, section 3 provides:
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be
56 See Rome Statute, supra note 1; see also Jennifer Rosenberg, Holocaust
Directory (visited Feb. 4, 1999) <http:/iholocaust.about.com/education/holocaust/
library/weekly/aa081997.htm>. "Endl6sung: 'Final Solution' (German) - The Nazi's
program to kill every Jew in Europe." Id.
57 See Yossi Klein Halevi, I'm Sorry, THE JERUSALEM REPORT, Oct. 30, 1997,
at 24 (quoting Israel Labor leader Ehud Barak, who asked forgiveness for his
predecessor's treatment of Sephardi immigrants).
58 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 5(1)(a) - (d). Under the
statute the Court has jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Id.
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criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person
(a) Commits such a crime . ...
This means that you are liable for genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, or the crime of aggression if you commit that crime.
That is perfectly reasonable. But let us read on. A person is also
"responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court" if he or she "(b) Orders, solicits or induces
the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is
attempted., 60 Let us recall there are now only four crimes "within the
jurisdiction of the Court" under Article 5: Genocide, War Crimes,
Crimes Against Humanity, and Aggression.61  This means that if a
government official orders someone to transfer children from one
group to another for the purpose of national assimilation, and the
recipient of the order makes an effort to effectuate the transfer, the
government official becomes guilty of genocide. I trust that this result
is sufficient to raise some concerns about the drafting of the statute.
But there are more anomalies created by Article 25, section 3,
which provides for various other forms of participating in an offense,
all of which render the actor liable for the offense in chief.62 Article
25, section 3(e) is enough to send shivers down the back of anyone
concerned about issues of legality. Any person is guilty of genocide if
he or she "directly and publicly incites others to commit
genocide." 63  In other words, writing or speaking in favor of
population transfer renders the speaker liable for the heinous crime of
genocide. The encroachment on civil liberties and freedom of speech
implicated by these provisions is not one we would tolerate lightly
under American law. To say that this kind of intrusive legislation
should be imposed internationally, without regard for countervailing
values, reveals a system of norms that has lost its connection to
common sense and traditional legal concerns.
How should these defects in the ICC statute be rectified? The
59 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 3, art. 25(3)(a).
60 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 3, art. 25(3)(b).
61 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 5(1)(a) - (d).
62 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 3, art. 25.
63 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 3, art. 25(3)(e).
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remedy lies, I believe, in paying much closer attention to the
definition of substantive offenses and carrying out the policy decision
in the Preamble that the purpose of the Court is not to prevent harm
but to punish criminals for crimes previously committed. If the
genocide statute were limited to punishing crimes already completed,
most of the provisions in the present Article 6 would become
irrelevant.
Yet the fact is, that at least in the modem political world,
genocide has never been successful. The Nazis tried. The Turks are
accused of trying against the Armenians, but the intended victims
survived. Genocide, therefore, has the inherent quality of being a
crime of attempt, an inchoate offense, in which punishable evil is
perceived prior to the successful completion of the crime.
It seems very clear that the ICC statute is conflicted at its core
about whether its fundamental purpose is, as stated in the Preamble, to
express identification with victims and avoid the impunity of
offenders.64 The structure of genocide suggests that the purpose of the
ICC is also to intervene before the occurrence of catastrophic harm in
order to avoid greater harm in the future. It is not clear to me why the
Statute is so conflicted on this fundamental question. I think it may be
because the international community itself is confused about why it is
punishing war criminals. Is it punishing war criminals simply because
justice requires the execution of people like Eichmann and the
Nuremberg defendants? Or is the purpose, as one often hears from
human rights advocates, to deploy criminal sanctions for the sake of a
safer world?65 To use the terms introduced earlier, should the primary
focus of the ICC proceedings be retrospective or prospective?
I offer these comments in the hope that these issues can be
resolved in such a way that will lead to the improvement of the statute
so that, in fact, the International Criminal Court can come into being
and that it can serve a legitimate and just function. Thank you.
64 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Preamble.
65 See David J. Scheffer, U.S. Policy and the International Criminal Court,
32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 529, 531 (1999) (discussing power of the court to punish
individuals who evaded justice in national courts). See generally Ruti Teitel, The
Universal and the Particular in International Criminal Justice, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 285 (1999) (stating that the international adjudication of human rights violations
reflects the human right's regime's goal to construct human rights as universal).
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PROF. TEITEL: I would like to introduce Richard Dicker who
is Associate Counsel of Human Rights Watch, Director of HRW's
campaign for an International Criminal Court and who was intimately
involved in the process at Rome.
Richard Dicker, Esq.
MR. DICKER: First, let me say it is good to be at a law school
discussing these issues because the kind of discussion/debate that we
are having this evening needs to take place in law schools all around
the country. Thanks for the opportunity to come and participate. I
want to note, before starting, Roy Lee's role as the Director of
Codification Division at the Office of Legal Affairs for the United
Nations. He helped three years' of preparatory committee meetings
by providing essential services that enabled those preparatory
meetings to function. At the Rome Diplomatic Conference, as head of
the conference Secretariat, he made the impossible possible. In terms
of Bill Leitzau, while I strongly disagree with his position, he is an
unusually thoughtful guy. Lastly, I want to acknowledge the presence
in the room tonight of several people involved in the Coalition for the
International Criminal Court which has been the convening entity for
hundreds of non-governmental organizations around the world.
The conclusion of the Treaty establishing the International
Criminal Court was a historic achievement. Completed after four
years of complex negotiations, the Treaty embodies a delicate balance
between divergent political interests and a synthesis of the world's
legal traditions. The Court's creation was driven by a diverse
coalition of states, north and south, a like-minded group of states that
included, among many others, Canada, Germany, the Nordics,
Argentina, South Africa Samoa, Hungary and the Republic of
Korea.66 This very diverse group of states that wanted an effective
and independent International Criminal Court. For example, in Rome
66 See Richard Dicker, Issues Facing the International Criminal Court's
Preparatory Commission, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 471, 471 (1999) (discussing support for
the Court and issues facing the Preparatory Commission); see also M. Cherif Bassioni,
Observations Concerning the 1997-98 Preparatory Committee's Work, 25 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 397 (1997).
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we saw the active participation of many African states. 67 The breadth
of support for the Court provides a strong starting point for
establishing an effective International Criminal Court.
The success of establishing the International Criminal Court
will be judged, of course, neither by the complexities of its constituent
instrument nor by the negotiating skill that made it possible, but by its
ability to make a difference in the real world. The International
Criminal Court is mandated to hold accountable those who are
accused of four core crimes. 68  I believe its purpose is providing
justice for victims and deterring the commission of these crimes in the
twenty-first century. The ICC will also help to extend the rule of law
so that those who commit genocide or crimes against humanity are
seen not only as doing atrocious deeds, but criminal acts. The Court
has enormous potential to change the human rights landscape in the
twenty-first Century.
There are many important provisions of the statute and I
cannot discuss all of them. Roy Lee touched on a number of them.
Let me quickly flag the important advances made in codifying crimes
of sexual violence and the protections in the statute for victims and
witnesses, particularly victims, who, all too often, happen to be
women and children. There is a very good basis for an effective
victim and witness unit. The statute authorizes an innovative role for
victim participation in the proceedings before the Court.
6 9
I am going to focus on two critical aspects of the statute: the
exercise of the Court's jurisdiction and the International Criminal
Court's relationship to national legal systems. First, jurisdiction. The
provisions here lie at the heart of the Treaty and they were the most
controversial elements of the package approved in the final hours of
the Rome Conference. The negotiators agreed on a regime of
automatic jurisdiction, which means that a state party, once it ratifies
the Treaty, accepts the Court's jurisdiction over the crimes within its
67 See Paul J. Magnarella, A Court for War Crimes in Africa, THE
INDEPENDENT, May 8, 1999, available in 1999 WL 11578842 (indicating that 19 African
states are signatories to the International Criminal Court Statute).
68 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 5(1). See also Michael
Bachrach, The Rome Statute Explained, N.Y.B.A. INT'L L. PRACTICUM, Spring 1999, at
37 (discussing the subject matter jurisdiction of the court).
69 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 6, art. 65(3).
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jurisdiction. 70  There is only one exception to this: the opt-out
provision in Article 124 which allows the state to opt-out of the
Court's jurisdiction over war crimes committed on its territories or by
its nationals for a non-renewable period of seven years.71
The most controversial and problematic aspect of the treaty is
contained in Article 12. Article 12 governs the preconditions that
must exist before the Court can have jurisdiction.72 This provision
provides that in cases, other than referrals by the Security Council, the
International Criminal Court will only be able to act where the state
on whose territory the crimes were committed, or the state of
nationality of the accused, had ratified the Treaty.73 This more limited
jurisdictional reach represents a concession that was made at the last
moment. It was made in large part, I believe, to placate the United
States. It is a significant limitation because the state of nationality of
the accused is often the same as the state on whose territory the crime
was committed. Think of Pol Pot's crimes in Cambodia and Idi
Amin's deeds in Uganda. In the absence of the Security Council's
referral of the situation in those countries to the Court, Cambodia and
Uganda would have to have ratified the treaty for the Court to exercise
jurisdiction over the responsible individuals.
This is a significant, but not a fatal, limitation. First, referrals
by the Security Council will have the unique consequence of binding
all member states of the United Nations, whether or not they are
States Parties of the Statute. Second, under the Article 12 regime, the
70 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 12(1). See also Scheffer,
supra note 65, at 532-33; Bachrach, supra note 68, at 37.
71 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 13, art. 124; see also Marcella
David, Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections to the International Criminal Court
and the Commitment to International Law, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 337, 370 (1999) (stating
that the opt-out provision is an incentive for states to promptly join the Criminal Court
because: (1) states that are reluctant to join the ICC can maintain jurisdiction; and (2) the
opt-out provision may not always be available to joining states).
72 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 12; see also Diane F.
Orentlicher, Politics by Other Means: The Law of the International Criminal Court, 32
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 489, 490 (1999) (indicating that the United States objects to Article
12 because it believes that it violates international law in subjecting non-party states to
the jurisdiction of the Court).
73 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 12; see also Scheffer, supra
note 41, at 18 (1999) (concluding that Article 12 gives the Criminal Court jurisdiction
over "anyone anywhere in the world").
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Court will more likely have jurisdiction in cases where there is an
international conflict where the state of nationality and territory are
not the same. Third and most importantly, the effect of this limitation
will be minimized to a great extent by universal ratification of the
Treaty. Beyond the 60 ratifications necessary for the Treaty to enter
into force, the closer the international community gets to universal
ratification, the greater the likelihood that the state of nationality of
the accused or the territorial state will be a state party.
If you look at the 75 state signatories, I believe that nearly a
third of those are African states.74 I think this reflects the fact that
many states that have recently made transitions from dictatorship and
human-rights-abusing regimes see an effective International Criminal
Court as providing protection against would-be violators.
Since the Rome conference, you have heard U.S. officials say
that Article 12, the jurisdiction provision, contravenes international
law.75 The argument - as I understand it - is that by exercising
jurisdiction over nationals of non-state parties the Treaty overreaches.
The claim that the treaty overreaches because it supposedly binds
states that have not ratified, is a distortion. First, the International
Criminal Court does not bind non-state parties; it does not impose any
obligation on non-state parties to the Court. Part 9 of the Statute,
which deals with state cooperation, specifically obliges only state
parties to cooperate, and a clear distinction is drawn between these
two categories. 76  In addition, and I think more tellingly, many
treaties, such as the Hijacking or Antiterrorism Conventions, provide
for states other than the state of nationality of the accused to exercise
jurisdiction over persons accused of committing the crime.77 These
74 Since February 11, 1999, the date of this Symposium, the number of
signatories has increased to 93, and African states now account for approximately one
fifth of all signatories. See CICC International Criminal Court Home Page, Rome Statute
Signature and Ratification Chart (visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://www.igc.apc.org/icc/
rome/html/ratify.html>.
75 See Dicker, supra note 66, at 474.
76 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 9.
77 See, e.g., Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 UST 1641; Montreal Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 UST 564; New
York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 UST 1975.
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treaties, like the International Criminal Court Statute, do not require
the state of nationality of the accused to be a party. The United States
is a party to many of these treaties and has exercised jurisdiction over
non-U.S. nationals in U.S. District Court on the basis of these
treaties. 8 This is a cornerstone of U.S. policy in combating terrorism.
Can you imagine the United States Department of Justice's reaction to
the claim by Libya that United States courts had no jurisdiction over a
Libyan national accused of hijacking an American aircraft because
Libya was not a party to that particular convention? That's the
objection we are hearing from the United States about Article 12.
Let me talk briefly about complimentarity. This is an
underlying principle of the Court. The U.S. delegation sought and
obtained many points fleshing out complimentarity that are now
codified in the statute. U.S. negotiators said this was necessary to
provide real assurance to policymakers in Washington, D.C. that the
Court could not be used to advance a political agenda. The Treaty
provides that the International Criminal Court will only act where
national systems are unable or unwilling to do SO. 7 9 There are some
very stringent standards that define "unwilling." "Unwillingness"
covers situations where the national authorities undertake decisions
with the intent to shield a person from criminal responsibility.80  In
addition, where there has been a delay which is inconsistent with
intent to bring the person to justice, and where the proceedings were
not conducted independently or were conducted in a manner that was
not consistent with an intent to bring the person to justice.81 This is an
extremely high standard. It is not satisfied simply by citing an
instance of a sloppy or an inefficient prosecutorial effort. This is an
especially heavy burden of proof given that the national authorities,
78 See Alien's Action for Tort [referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act], 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1999). "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States." Id. See also treaties listed supra note 77.
79 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 17(1)(a).
80 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 17(2)(a); see also Jamison G.
White, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Augusto Pinochet, Universal Jurisdiction, the
ICC, and a Wake-Up Call for Former Heads of State, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 127, 171
(1999).
81 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 17(2)(b) - (c); see also White,
supra note 80, at 171.
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not the International Criminal Court prosecutor, will possesses the
relevant information about the steps taken on the national level.
In addition to these high thresholds, there are several distinct
opportunities for a state or the accused to challenge the admissibility
of the case before the Court. This is another area in which the United
States delegation won major concessions. First, states (state parties or
non-state parties) can initiate a preliminary challenge when the
International Criminal Court prosecutor announces the intention to
investigate a situation that has been first referred to the Court.82 The
Treaty requires the prosecutor to notify all states that would "normally
exercise jurisdiction" of his or her intention to proceed.83 Any state,
whether a party or nonparty, may then inform the court that it is
dealing with the situation domestically and the prosecutor will defer to
that investigation.84 There is a second procedure. If the parties seek
to, they can attempt to block a prosecution by challenging the
admissibility of a particular case.8 5  Then the prosecutor bears the
burden to prove the "unwillingness" to proceed on the national level.86
My point is that there are significant safeguards in this Statute that
address the legitimate and real concerns of the United States
Department of Defense. These safeguards will minimize the risks of
politically motivated prosecution, directed against Americans or
anyone else. This is not foolproof. But perfect judicial mechanisms
are difficult to find on the national or international level. The benefits
in human rights enforcement that will come from this Court and to the
best interests of U.S. foreign policy will be immeasurable. Thank
you.
PROF. TEITEL: Thanks, Richard. Our final speaker is my
82 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 18; see also Panel Discussion,
Association of American Law Schools Panel on International Criminal Court, 36 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 223, 246 (1999).
83 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 18(1).
84 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 18(2).
85 See id. at § 7. If a challenge is made the Prosecutor must suspend the
investigation until the Pre-Trial Chamber determines its validity. Id. at art. 19(7).
86 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, art. 19(10). "If the Court has
decided that a case is inadmissible under article 17 [the "unwillingness" section], the
Prosecutor may submit a request for a review of the decision when he or she is fully
satisfied that new facts have arisen which negate the basis on which the case had
previously been found inadmissible ... " Id.
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colleague Professor Dubinsky. He has been a Fellow at the Council
on Foreign Relations and has a specialization in European Community
Law but, primarily, for purposes of this Panel, he has been an
advocate for a continuing role for national courts in policing human
rights abuses, including war crimes.
Professor Paul Dubinsky
PROF. DUBINSKY: Thank you, Ruti. I approach this debate
as someone who follows the development of international institutions
and, in particular, the relationship between our existing international
courts and the new international tribunals we have created during the
past decades. With that in mind, I am going to put forward some not
terribly profound, but hopefully useful remarks to put this debate into
perspective.
This is not the first international court we have created. We
have seen this before, from the International Court of Justice in the
Hague, the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, to the new
WTO dispute resolution panels. We should draw on those examples
to recognize that there are certain things that international courts do
well and other things less well.
If we look at the International Criminal Court, putting the
specifics of the Statute aside for the moment, what is it likely to do
well and what is it likely to do poorly? What it might do very well is
provide clarity and uniform interpretation to international human
rights and humanitarian law. We have an existing system where war
crimes or torture violations are prosecuted civilly or criminally in
national courts all around the world and there is often great
disuniformity and lack of clarity in those decisions. The ICC could
develop expertise in applying international criminal laws to specific
sets of facts. Existing national courts could then use the new court's
precedents and accord them a certain force of persuasion, if not strict
precedential value. A more uniform interpretation is greatly needed, I
might add, in certain basic areas such as defining command control
responsibility or even the substantive violations themselves, such as
what constitutes genocide and torture.
What else might the International Criminal Court be really
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good at? Perhaps at resolving immunity issues, such as those at issue
in the Pinochet case. 87 British Courts have been struggling for two
months in that case trying to figure out how to deal with diplomatic
immunity, sovereign immunity and head-of-state. immunity. An
international criminal court created under the auspices of the United
Nations would be able to adjudicate those immunity issues in an
international forum that would be able, to some degree, to avoid a
confrontation of one state (Chile) against another (the U.K.) over
whether the latter failed to honor the former's immunity and rights as
a sovereign government.
Finally, the International Criminal Court may best be suited to
prosecute "big fish" - the notorious criminals and human rights
abusers of the century. Try such major figures in an even-handed, un-
politicized manner. Moreover the tribunal that sits in judgment of an
individual accused of a crime against humanity should ideally be one
suited to speak for all of humanity. An international criminal court
representing a broad section of the world is perhaps most appropriate
for such a task.
What are international courts not terribly good at? First, they
are not well suited to processing a large volume of cases. In public
discourse and in this room, one hears the claim that the International
Criminal Court is going to eliminate the sort of bloodshed we have
witnessed this century or that it will somehow address large numbers
of war. I doubt that. My belief is that our existing national court
systems will be the primary tribunals to enforce rights and to police
international human rights violations well into the 21s' century. The
discussions surrounding the International Criminal Court would go
further if this likelihood were acknowledged. The question we should
be asking is what could the International Criminal Court add to our
87 See U.K. House of Lords: In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 430, 432-33 (1999).
Pinochet was the Head of State of Chile from 1973 until 1990. Id. at 432. It was alleged
that he committed "various crimes against humanity" throughout that period. Id. While
he was in England receiving medical treatment, Spain issued international warrants for his
arrest to face trial for such crimes. Id. These warrants were quashed by the Divisional
Court of the Queen's Bench Division so that they may determine whether he maintained
official immunity only throughout his tenure or whether it extends beyond. Id. The
House of Lords held that with respect to the torture allegation, Pinochet was without
immunity for acts occurring after the U.K. had ratified and implemented the Torture
Convention. Id.
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existing system of national and regional tribunals for exposing and
punishing human rights violations. The ICC is not going to have the
budget to handle any more than a very small fraction of its potential
cases. That, again, is my view as to why it can contribute most by
carefully interpreting the relevant treatise and analyzing case law from
a variety of jurisdictions.
Second, national authorities will continue to be needed to
gather evidence, to arrest suspects, and to imprison those convicted.
In fact, the International Criminal Court statute has whole sections on
just where convicted persons are to be incarcerated.88 Finally, the
Statute takes a schizophrenic position with respect to national courts.
Despite repeated references to complimentarity, there is no consistent
,vision of how the International Criminal Court should relate to
national courts. My view is that, for the foreseeable future, national
courts will continue to be the primary tribunals for victims to obtain
some sort of compensation, reparation and restitution.
A key fault of the Statute is that it is too ambitious. Yet in one
key area it is not ambitious enough; its meager provisions on what the
Court can do to collect assets are inadequate. 89  A number of
defendants will have stolen substantial assets from victims, or
embezzled them from the governments they represented. What can
the Court do about this problem? It is not going to be able to process
large numbers of claims for restitution. National courts will do that.
Perhaps the International Criminal Court statute should contain a
provision that the Court's criminal convictions should be, in some
sense, resjudicata in national civil suits so that, many facts would not
need to be retried in civil proceedings in national courts.
It is sometimes overlooked that in the last ten years, maybe
even longer than that, there has been a steady increase in the
involvement of national courts in adjudicating crimes against
humanity, war crimes and similar grave violations of international
human rights. What we have discovered from the Marcos case for
88 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 10, arts. 103 - 04 & 106.
89 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 6, art. 75 (providing that the Court shall
establish principles "relating to reparations to, or in respect of victims, including
restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation."). Id. at § 2.
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instance, 90 is that at the end of the day there can be a huge amount of
assets and many competing claims for those assets - government
claims, victims' claims and other third-party claims. In the Marcos
litigation, for example, a class of human rights victims obtained a
large judgment against the Marcos estate, only to encounter difficulty
collecting on the judgment because of the competing claims of the
Philippine government. 91 The International Criminal Court could be
of use in potentially resolving which of those competing claims takes
priority, a function well suited to an international tribunal, particularly
with respect to competing government claims. As the Statute is
currently written, it makes no attempt for the Court to serve this
function.
To conclude, let me just say one final word about what you
might call the deal-breaker issues that the other panelists have been
talking about. If you keep in mind what the International Criminal
Court is likely to do best and what it is likely to do less well, that may
help resolve some of those issues. My own view is that the proposal
that members of the Security Council would have a veto on which
prosecutions may go forward is not going to work. It undercuts what
the International Criminal Court is most likely to do best, that is to
offer a neutral forum for justice in which everybody's ox can be
gored. That is what the International Criminal Court is supposed to
do. A veto drastically undercuts its ability to perform that central role
effectively.
Let me also address what, I think, has gotten us off track, and
that is worrying about the procedural aspects of who will refer what
case and who will restrain an overzealous prosecutor. There is
actually a substantive disagreement or a substantive problem that
underlies this issue. Our experience with national courts and
international courts is that sometimes they sort of go off on their own.
The real worry is that we are not sure what this prosecutor or this
court down the road will think is a war crime or will think - as
90 See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving
10,000 class action plaintiffs who suffered torture, execution, and family disappearances
during Ferdinand Marcos's tenure as president of the Philippines). See also In re Estate
of Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992) (wrongful death action brought by a Philippine
citizen against the daughter of Ferdinand Marcos).
" See Hilao, 103 F.3d 762.
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Professor Fletcher aptly pointed out - constitutes genocide. We
ought to address our attention to tightening those definitions,
providing rules of interpretation, and ways of constraining the Court
and prosecutor rather than focus on a Security Council veto, which is
a sledgehammer approach in my view.
My final point is that we should view this Court as a work-in-
progress. This is the first time around. Our first experience with it
will not be perfect. We should get it started and fully anticipate
returning to this Treaty ten years hence. Thanks.
PROF. TEITEL: Okay. Now, I would like to take a couple of
questions from the audience and allow the Panel an opportunity to
respond to those questions and, perhaps, take in some of each other's
comments.
THE AUDIENCE: I have worked in field missions for the
United Nations for a number of years. My question concerns
Professor Fletcher's comments about genocide and the definition in
the International Criminal Court Statute. It seems to me that sections
(d) and (e) are definitions that are verbatim from the Genocide
Convention. This is also true for incitement, as included in the other
paragraph. However, conspiracy, et cetera, is not included in the
Genocide Convention, therefore, the Genocide Convention's
definition seems more restrictive in terms of what can constitute
genocide. How can a Treaty that has been in effect as long as the
Genocide Convention not represent some kind of legitimate definition
for genocide?
The second question, if I may, is to the Major, with regard to
the existence of consensus on the Statute. Although, there are not
settled definitions to a lot of these crimes, there is a certain level of
consensus in terms of what constitutes customary international law,
crimes against humanity, war crimes based both on customary law
and treaty law and, also, genocide based on the Treaty so how can this
not represent some important level of consensus? Those are my two
questions.
PROF. FLETCHER: Well, I don't know how the world has
somehow ignored these defects in the original Genocide Treaty.92 I
found the comments of my fellow panelists interesting on this point,
92 Genocide Convention, supra note 4.
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and that is, I think, the issue of legalism and legality, the absence of
precise definitions is not at the forefront of the crusade, we are not
terribly concerned about this question. However, I think, there is a
conflict between a shared understanding of who an international war
criminal is. We all sort of have images of who these criminals are;
people who are causing substantial amounts of harm, that are,
actually, engaged in killing and raping, all sorts of terrible things.
That is the sort of paradigm that motivates the Court.
Then, there is something that I can only call a "propaganda"
function. The propaganda function means that we have included
things in the Treaty like cultural genocide, offences that will probably
not be enforced, however, they were included because there is a
substantial propaganda function involved in including them. It may
be that some prosecutor will come along some day and choose to
enforce them, this is a risk that we have learned to appreciate.
Therefore when these provisions enter into an international agreement
as propaganda, there is an enormous risk involved that some day they
will come home and roost, that they will, actually, be applied. I think,
that is a very serious danger that we ignore amidst the general
enthusiasm for the campaign to get the "Big Fish," as it was said.
DR. LEE: Just two points on the last question. I thought that
Professor Fletcher's comments are very helpful particularly from the
substantive point of view. One of my concerns, during the Rome
conference, was the absence of criminal lawyers on the various
delegations. To my knowledge there were very few delegations that,
actually, had criminal lawyers on their delegation.
Some of the points just mentioned will, I think, be addressed
during the Preparatory Commission, particularly, in connection with
the elements of crimes. I have seen some of the first drafts and they
do address some of the issues but not all of them will be covered. In
this regard I do want to mention that this is a characteristic of
international negotiations. In Rome, 185 states were invited and 160
took part till the end. Each delegation represents its own criminal
system and its own criminal law. Each held to its heart its own
cultural, political and historical values. States all wanted their values
represented and reflected in the Statute. Clearly, this is not possible.
You are not just drafting for yourself. You need to make a lot of
compromises in order to come to agreement. The result is a mixture
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that is not always satisfactory and within which there are
imperfections.
The examples Professor Fletcher gave are typical of
international negotiations. I think, that is a problem fundamental to
all international legislation. How to maintain concordance amongst
the language versions is really a challenging problem. We will have
to find a way to deal with that. We should however remember that
United Nations negotiations and instruments cannot only be in one
language and need to be conducted in the common working
languages. Six languages are not bad and it could be considerably
worse for an institution of 185 States, particularly in comparison with
an institution such as the European Union, which uses as many
languages as it has members. Given that, the Rome Statute is a
multilateral instrument and a product of multi-state negotiation, it is
inevitable that the texts are not perfect from any particular language or
linguistic standpoint. Thank you.
MAJOR LIETZAU: I would like to begin by saying, I could
not agree more with Professor Fletcher and Dr. Lee regarding the
definitions of crimes. First, with respect to the Genocide Convention,
I admit that the difficulty derives from the Convention itself. Here,
we see one of the problems associated with the task before us, and it
relates to your issue regarding consensus. Certainly, there was
agreement regarding at least the verbiage associated with genocide,
some of the crimes against humanity, and some of the war crimes.
However, there was not clear agreement on all the substantive aspects
of the crimes found in the Rome Treaty. There were probably similar
differences of opinion when the Genocide Convention was negotiated
50 years ago.
The many perspectives animating a multilateral treaty
negotiation make very improbable the notion that all views will be
accommodated perfectly. The very nature of negotiation within time
constraints demands that it be an exercise in compromise. Ambiguous
wording serves to facilitate that compromise, allowing each party that
has a concern over a particular issue to interpret terminology in the
way that benefits their side. That is how agreement was reached in
the Genocide Convention and many of the other treaties that served as
antecedents to the offenses we find in the Statute. Newer offenses
were negotiated the same way in Rome.
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Consensus provides a good basis for the legality of some
aspects of the International Criminal Court. However, the
jurisdictional regime, as it applies to non-party states, is not benefited
by a consensus foundation, and I would obviously differ with
Professor Fletcher regarding the import of that fact and whether it is
merely an issue of trusting judges. The very same well-meaning
people that negotiated this text and allowed these illogical anomalies
to occur are the kind of people who may become judges. As a nation,
we put checks and balances not only into the internal workings of our
judicial system, but also into the very structure of the government that
gives authority to the judiciary. The proposed ICC is an autonomous
court. All of the complimentarity characteristics and all of the
prosecutorial guidelines that Richard Dicker spoke about involve
checks and balances internal to the Court. Differences of opinion are
ultimately decided by those eighteen judges.
I think, the answer to your question on consensus is partly
found in the comments by Professor Dubinsky when he listed the
things that this Court would be "good at." I am not so certain those
are the kinds of things we want the Court to be good at, that is, filling
in the gaps as to what genocide means or what purposes we intend to
serve by punishing people. What does torture mean? What does
command responsibility mean? These are issues that were negotiated
in international conventions. There was no exact eye-to-eye
agreement on every concept, so negotiators found ambiguous wording
that accommodated their negotiating concerns but failed to provide
the kind of rigor characteristic of criminal law. Consensus regarding
verbiage to be used in one context may not be consensus for its use in
another.
Lastly, I agree wholeheartedly with Dr. Lee that, in fact, there
were not many criminal lawyers at this negotiation. In these kinds of
things, it seems to me, though I readily admit my neophyte status, that
we normally have subject matter experts negotiate the substance of a
treaty, assisted by several international lawyers who focus on the
contractual arrangements. Here, the subject-matter experts should
have been criminal lawyers, but international lawyers were frequently
asked to fill both rolls - taking on the roll of subject-matter expert as
well. There were few people you could talk to with criminal
expertise, and one was sometimes tempted to ask, "when was the last
542 [Vol. XVI
2000] INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
time you were in a courtroom and made that kind of an argument to a
judge?" Thank you.
PROF. TEITEL: Since we are running short on time, I will
collect questions from the audience and let our panelists comment on
some or all of them.
THE AUDIENCE: I would like to make two brief comments.
First, with respect to what appears to be an unprecedented fear of
international jurists. International courts have performed their role
responsibly and properly, and the judges have certainly not come
under fire for any breaches of duty. And second, I attended the Rome
convention, and as I remember it, there was no midnight push to vote.
THE AUDIENCE: What are the criteria the United Nations
takes into account when deciding whether or not to follow a
consensus approach to negotiations for international treaties and when
to follow with another approach?
THE AUDIENCE: For Dr. Lee. I was wondering if you could
speak a little bit about if there was a debate regarding the death
penalty in Rome and how it was resolved, if it was, what, basically,
the Rome Conference decided about what would happen to convicted
criminals.
THE AUDIENCE: My question deals with the issue of
legality, that is, couldn't the Court expand, if it was concerned with
the causation of crime, couldn't it expand its list of crimes by looking
at, for instance, the issue of hate speech or things that could cause
genocide to happen and create a much more narrowly tailored statute
that could deal with that so that victim's or even perpetrator's rights
could be protected as far as the due process is concerned? My
concern is that some of what has been said today sounded a lot like
throwing the baby out with the bath water.
PROF. TEITEL: Thank you. Paul?
PROF. DUBINSKY: I just have a brief response to the
question regarding our faith in international jurists. I speak as
somebody who has spent a number of years studying the European
Union and generally likes much of what the European Court of Justice
has done. Nonetheless, if we are honest about it, there have been
periods of time when that European Court has been quite activist in its
interpretation of the treaty's texts to the extent that some prominent
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scholars publicly asked if it had "gone wild., 93 Whether you like the
European Court of Justice's rulings or not, I think we must deal
honestly with fears that similar things could happen with the
International Criminal Court. Supporters of the International Criminal
Court must do something more than simply reassure skeptics by
saying that the judges and prosecutor will be conservative and
reasonable people and so forth. That is not meeting a reasonable fear
at its source.
PROF. TEITEL: Okay. George -
PROF. FLETCHER: Well, I am very intrigued by this
question that the gentleman posed about hate speech. I think that was
a wonderful question, actually, because it dramatizes, for me, the
fundamental problem. As I see it human rights advocates want to do
good in the world and this is the source of a great deal of evil. The
purpose of doing good implies intervening to prevent harm before it
occurs and, I think, that is basically, inconsistent with the philosophy
of criminal punishment as outlined in the Preamble to the Court,
which stresses punishment as act of retributive justice.94 There is no
good to be expected from retributive punishment (avoiding impunity
of offenders) except the abstract value of doing justice, as was done in
Nuremberg and was done in the Eichmann case and was done, to
some extent, in the Yugoslav Tribunal and the Rwanda Tribunal. The
claim that you can actually deter people from committing the crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC strikes me as an extremely
dangerous proposition that has, absolutely, no factual foundation.
I am intrigued by the question of hate speech because it is
entirely possible that conduct would be punished under this present
Statute that would be constitutionally protected in the United States.
Suppose that you have an Internet site that advocates the killing of
some group covered by the Genocide Convention. The people who
have set up that Internet site would be engaged in speech that is
93 See Mauro Cappelletti, Is the European Court of Justice "Running Wild"?,
12 EUROPEAN L. REV. 3 (1987); HJALTE RUSMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLICY (1986).
94 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Preamble. "Affirming that the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the
national level and by enhancing international cooperation." Id.
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protected by the United States Constitution. 95  Yet the site would
violate Article 25, section 3(e) of the ICC Statute.96 This would be a
difficult situation. There is no way that the United States can endorse
an international tribunal that would punish conduct constitutionally
protected in the United States. The only way that we avoid problems
of this sort is to set our sights lower and to say that an international
criminal court should only punish in cases where there are real
victims, where crimes have been committed and punishing is a
requirement of doing justice.
PROF. TEITEL: Doctor Lee?
DR. LEE: Yes. Thank you. I agree with what Professor
Fletcher just said. But, the work of the Preparatory Commission will
show that the focus is going to be on past acts rather than on what he
referred to as prevention. In criminal law at the national level, we
have moved from punishment to crime prevention, just as we are
talking about preventive diplomacy over the use of force in
international relations. Insofar as international criminal law is
concerned, its focus is still punishment; we have not gone much
further than that. Philosophically, it is very interesting to talk about
crime prevention. The international system is still behind national
developments in criminal law. This does not mean that we should not
focus on crime prevention. The creation of the ICC will certainly
have, I hope, a deterrent effect.
Now, regarding the question of the death penalty, that turned
out to be far more difficult than we anticipated because there was a
group of states insistent that death penalty must be included in the
Statute. But the relevant United Nations conventions have already
excluded the death penalty.97 I should also mention that there was
another group of countries that felt life imprisonment should also be
95 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. See also ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)
(holding the First Amendment protects speech on the Internet to the same extent as it does
print media).
96 In accordance with the statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: ... (e)
In respect to the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit
genocide." Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 3, art. 25(3)(e).
97 See Press Release, UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome With
Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998 (visited
Feb. 11, 2000) <http://www.un.org./icc>.
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excluded on the ground of cruelty. Under their national system, life
imprisonment is not permitted.98 Here is a profound dilemma. We
were dealing with the most serious crimes and yet two of the most
serious penalties - death penalty and life imprisonment - must be
excluded at the insistence of most representatives. How do you
reconcile these positions? In the end, both the death penalty and life
imprisonment were excluded from the Statute. To meet the objections
of certain states, the President of the Conference made a statement to
the effect that the inclusion and non-inclusion of the death penalty
was not intended to have any affect on national policy in that regard.
It still posed an extremely difficult problem for countries such as
Trinidad and Tobago. It was amongst the first countries to initiate the
creation of this International Criminal Court. But, under its national
law, the death penalty was necessary and indispensable. 99 At the end,
in spite of the President's statement, Trinidad and Tobago did not sign
the Statute in Rome, as much as it strongly supported the Court.
Singapore is another example. The non-inclusion of the death penalty
was contrary to its national policy.'00
I also wanted to say a few words about the Rome process and
the question of consensus, which are very important points raised
during our discussion here. The conference created numerous groups
for informal consultations on all the major topics. At one point, we
had more than ten groups meeting almost simultaneously and on a
continuous basis. It was very difficult to find sufficient rooms and
interpreters to accommodate those meetings. But, nevertheless
98 See William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human
Rights Approach, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 461, 480 (1997) (explaining that Yugoslav,
Norwegian, Spanish, and Portuguese delegates view the death penalty and life
imprisonment as cruel and unusual punishment and contrary to human rights).
99 See Jeanne Moore, World Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1999, at A6
(explaining that Trinidad and Tobago "ignored Britain's pleas to eliminate the death
penalty and have moved to withdraw from international protocols on capital
punishment."). See also Leslie Cosimir, Sand, Sun - & Siege: Rising Tide of Violence
Hits Isles of Caribbean, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jul. 18, 1999, at 24. Due to the high rate of
violent crime, citizens of Trinidad and Tobago feel that the death penalty is inherently
necessary. Id.
100 See Michael J. Dennis, Current Developments: The Fifty-fourth Session of
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 246, 248 (1999). "Fifty-one
countries signed a statement circulated by Singapore, affirming that retention of the death
penalty was a matter of sovereign decision making." Id.
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extensive informal consultations were carried out. No state was
excluded from such processes. Of course, some consultations were
organized by the delegations themselves, and not all representatives
were invited to those group meetings. To my knowledge, all the
major states participated actively in all those meetings and they were
not excluded, unless they did not belong to the groups holding the
meetings. Of course, the real question is whether a delegation was
able to convince the other delegations that its viewpoints should be
taken into account. This question of ability to persuade should not be
confused with questions concerning the openness and non-
exclusiveness of the negotiation.
Let me just give you one example on the question of
jurisdiction to illustrate how compromise was necessary and was
made. As you probably know, 76 percent of the states that spoke on
the question were in favor of, what is called, the "Korean Formula,"
which would allow the Court to have jurisdiction when one or more of
the following states were parties to the Statute: the state on whose
territory the crime was committed, the state of nationality of the
accused, the custodian state or the state of which the victim is a
national. 1° 1  This is one extreme supported by 76 percent of the
conference participating states. On the other extreme, you have four
to six states supporting the "consent" principle according to which the
Court can only exercise its jurisdiction over those states that have
given their specific consent.10 2 In between these two extremes, you
have the rest of the states favoring something in between.0 3 At the
101 See Craig Turner, U.S. a Loner at Talks on Criminal Court, L.A. TIMES,
Jun. 18, 1998 at A8 (reporting that more than fifty western democracies favor broad
jurisdiction of the international criminal court).
102 See Craig Turner, Disagreements Threaten Global Criminal Court, L.A.
TIMES, Jul. 14, 1998 at Al 7. See also Annan Faults U.S. and 9 Other Lands in Debate on
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 14, 1998 at A7. The United States and India, among others,
opposed giving the International Criminal Court jurisdiction for those countries that did
not sign the treaty, unless there is specific consent by that state. Id. See generally,
Background Information: Trigger Mechanism and the Exercise, of the Court's
Jurisdiction (May 1998) (visited Feb. 11, 2000) <http://www.un.org/icc> [hereinafter
Trigger Mechanism].
103 See Turner, supra note 101 (noting that a compromise proposal was being
discussed, which attempted to work with the Security Council, but not allowing a single
state, on its own, to halt a case or investigation). See also Trigger Mechanism, supra note
102.
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end, the proposal from the Bureau was a compromise and was
formulated in consultation with the coordinators who led those
informal consultations. The compromise was that the Court would
have jurisdiction when two of the following states are parties to the
Statute: the territorial state and the state of nationality of the
accused. 10 4 Here, my point is not about whether the compromise is
good or bad. My point is that compromise was essential when there
were divergent positions. Here is a very good example of how
compromises were made. Thank you.
MAJOR LIETZAU: With regard to the comments addressing
judges and the vote process, I will briefly respond to both issues.
Fear of judges: I do not want to be misinterpreted, there is no
fear of judges, individually. We, of course, assume all judges will
perform as admirably as the international judges people have cited in
whatever few tribunals, we have had as examples. We are not talking
about individual personalities or lack of integrity, but instead we are
concerned about the best structure for government. In Philadelphia,
over 200 years ago, some people got together and talked about how
best to govern, how best to incorporate checks and balances into the
structure of government. These were not intended to be specific
criticisms of the personalities that would later fill the roles, but they
were based on a general understanding of human nature. I think that
many would agree with the basic premise that courts tend to arrogate
power to themselves. Another maxim is that power corrupts. To
guard against this, we created a structure of checks and balances that
insure judges are ultimately accountable to the citizenry whom they
judge, and that they play the role intended for them.
This topic came up during negotiations when addressing the
issue of specificity commented upon by Professor Fletcher. American
legal culture sees a judge's role very differently than do many others.
The U.S. fought very hard to get the kind of logic and specificity that
Professor Fletcher spoke about injected into the Statute. Significant
concern was caused by the fact that many countries not only disagreed
with us as to what the answers to certain questions of law should be,
but that they also did not care to debate or to resolve those questions.
They thought issues regarding elements of crimes and various
104 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Part 2, arts. 12-14.
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principles of criminal law were more appropriately resolved by judges
than by states. That is, judges would essentially serve as legislators
and would decide those issues that states parties had not been able to
agree upon. That concept of a judiciary, coupled with basic checks
and balances to which we, as Americans, are accustomed, is what
underlies U.S. concerns with respect to judges. I'll move more
quickly through the other issues.
Late-night-package: yes - it was a late-night-package, and,
yes - the entire United States delegation woke up early, raced to the
room and started pouring through the document wondering what was
going to be in it. There were deals struck late into the evening. I
would also differ slightly with Dr. Lee with respect to the 76 percent
figure as supporting the Korean Formula. We kept careful records of
the interventions, but our numbers reflected much less support for the
Korea'n Proposal than 76 percent. (I suspect we are again dealing with
a lack of specificity - this time regarding what was meant by certain
interventions.)
Lastly, I feel I have to answer the question about consensus
versus the vote approach. I cannot speak as to what the United States'
policy is with respect to what kind of voting we need in various
treaties. I do think it is important to realize that this is a dilemma, and
as Dr. Lee has pointed out, it would be impossible to achieve
consensus on every detail of everything in every Treaty. A vote
appears to take care of that problem; on the other hand, one would
question compromises where the number of states in favor of a norm
embodies the measure of acceptability. With respect to the issues we
are dealing with here, I think we have a very different kind of treaty.
If there were any treaty regarding which an argument militating in
favor of consensus would be appropriate, it would be in this one. We
are not just addressing the relationships between states; we are talking
about criminal culpability for individual citizens. In other treaties,
when there is no consensus, a state simply does not join the treaty, and
the requirement or norm in question does not apply to that state. This
is a fundamental principle of international law codified in the Vienna
Convention on Treaties. 10 5 However, with respect to the norms being
1o5 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 34-38,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 341. See also Scheffer, supra note 40, at 18 (1999) (illustrating that a
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established here, we are bandying about terms like "universality."
When criminal culpability is associated with the use of such terms, a
consensus procedure is appropriate.
PROF. TEITEL: I have allowed Richard the final word here
and then we can adjourn for more discussion over refreshments.
MR. DICKER: Let me make several points. The first involves
complimentarity. Complimentarity puts this Court's jurisdiction in a
secondary position. There isn't a primacy of jurisdiction, and the
notion of concurrent jurisdiction is quite different under this
complimentarity regime. Professor Dubinsky raised an interesting
question in terms of what needs to take place domestically for states to
bring their national laws into harmony with the Statute. One
contribution a number of states need to make is funding experts to
assist states that are looking for advice and guidance to amend or
adopt national legislation in a way that will make their ratification of
the Treaty effective. This is a big challenge.
Secondly, in terms of process, I just want to bring in some
perspective here in the sense that having participated in the
preparation for the Rome phase for three years, everyone knew that
this was going to be a midnight deal, struck at the last moment and
that the nub of the issue was going to be Article 12 or jurisdiction in
combination with whether or not there was be an ex officio prosecutor.
Everyone went into the Rome Conference knowing that if the Statute
were completed, it was going to be a past-midnight deal and, indeed,
it was, and we all knew what the big issues were so there was, really,
no surprise, in terms of the process aspect of how it ended. I do want
to say that some of the last-minute nature of the process (such as Bill
was highlighting) had to do with the effort of a number of states to
really extend themselves to the United States government in an effort
to twist the arm of the U.S., or conversely, to mitigate the level of
discomfort that the United States might have. So, I think, that is
another reason why things went on, and on, and on without our
receiving a final text until 2:00 o'clock in the morning of the last day.
I think that there are some interesting issues we did not get to
discuss and I want to just flag one of them for you. That is, what is
state that has signed a treaty, abides by that treaty, and cannot simply choose to opt out of
specific requirements).
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going to be the relationship between this International Criminal Court
and, hopefully, more active vigorous national courts, like the courts in
France or Switzerland or Sweden that filed cases against General
Pinochet? Hopefully, we are seeing something of an international
revival of national court activism and we want to see that and it raises
some interesting questions in terms of an emerging system of
international justice composed of different elements and how they all
play together.
PROF. TEITEL: Thanks Richard. Let me thank all of our
panelists and our audience for what has been a very thoughtful
discussion of a topical subject at an auspicious time.
